Adventures in Femtoland: 350 Yuan for Invaluable Fun. GSM networks are compromised for over five years. Starting from passive sniffing of unencrypted traffic, moving.
Black Hat USA 2. 01. Briefings. Keynote. In the early days of the public internet, we believed that we were helping build something totally new, a world that would leave behind the shackles of age, of race, of gender, of class, even of law.
Hi, Changing your DNS lowers your speed. If you don’t wan’t to,you can access these sites using their IP addresses.However,the page will appear garbled since CSS. The DNS port number is 53. use ssh to tunnel to your trusted machine, which does all the web queries for you (I would assume). I've never done it, but it seems pretty. NEXTAV Cloudhub All-in-One Datastream WiFi Hotspot & USB Storage With 5200mAh Power Bank - NX-S100. A simple solution is to find someone with a VPN on their phone. Have them connect their VPN, then make their phone a hotspot. Connect your device to their wifi (now.
Paralelamente a estos intentos, siempre mantenía mi equipo capturando tráfico WiFi en modo monitor, y analizaba las capturas, además de las que obtenía con Cain. A captive portal is a special web page that is shown before using the Internet normally. The portal is often used to present a login page. [1] This is done by.
When connecting to the internet in an internet cafe, hotspot or other public connection you could be opening yourself up to serious security issues. Security On iPad. A practical and affordable solution and tips for securing your iPad and keeping your information safe from hackers and identity thieves. Russian Tea Time. Welcome to Russian Tea Time! The restaurant where everyone feels at home and everyone is welcome! Owner and Chef, Klara Muchnik, and her son, Vadim.
Twenty years on, "cyberspace" looks a lot less revolutionary than it once did. Hackers have become information security professionals. Racism and sexism have proven resiliant enough to thrive in the digital world. Big companies are getting even bigger, and the decisions corporationsnot just governmentsmake about security, privacy, and free speech affect hundreds of thousands, or millions, of people.
The Four Horsemen of the Infocalypseterrorists, pedophiles, drug dealers, and money launderersare driving online policy as governments around the world are getting more deeply involved in the business of regulating the network. Meanwhile, the Next Billion Internet Users are going to connect from Asia and developing countries without a Bill of Rights. Centralization, Regulation, and Globalization are the key words, and over the next twenty years, we'll see these forces change digital networks and information security as we know it today. So where does that leave security, openness, innovation, and freedom? The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is being used to weld the hood of cars shut to keep engine software safe from mechanics. Will we still have the Freedom to Tinker even in the oldest of technologies? What does it mean that the U.
S. is a big player in the zero- day market even as international agreements seek to regulate exploit code and surveillance tools? Will we see liability for insecure software and what does that mean for open source? With advances in artificial intelligence that will decide who gets run over, who gets a loan, who gets a job, how far off can legal liability regimes for robots, drones, and even algorythms be? Is the global Internet headed for history's dustbin, and what does a balkanized network mean for security, for civil rights?
In this talk, Granick will look forward at the forces that are shaping and will determine the next 2. Briefings. In the Summer of 2.
Microsoft silently introduced two new exploit mitigations into Internet Explorer with the goal of disrupting the threat landscape. These mitigations increase the complexity of successfully exploiting a use- after- free vulnerability. June's patch (MS1. Isolated Heap, which handles most of the DOM and supporting objects. July's patch (MS1. Memory. Protection for freeing memory on the heap.
This talk covers the evolution of the Isolated Heap and Memory. Protection mitigations, examines how they operate, and studies their weaknesses. It outlines techniques and steps an attacker must take to attack these mitigations to gain code execution on use- after- free vulnerabilities where possible. It describes how an attacker can use Memory. Protection as an oracle to determine the address at which a module will be loaded to bypass ASLR. Finally, additional recommended defenses are laid out to further harden Internet Explorer from these new attack vectors. Imagine a technology that is built into every Windows operating system going back to Windows 9.
System, executes arbitrary code, persists across reboots, and does not drop a single file to disk. Such a thing does exist and it's called Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
With increased scrutiny from anti- virus and 'next- gen' host endpoints, advanced red teams and attackers already know that the introduction of binaries into a high- security environment is subject to increased scrutiny. WMI enables an attacker practicing a minimalist methodology to blend into their target environment without dropping a single utility to disk. WMI is also unlike other persistence techniques in that rather than executing a payload at a predetermined time, WMI conditionally executes code asynchronously in response to operating system events. This talk will introduce WMI and demonstrate its offensive uses. We will cover what WMI is, how attackers are currently using it in the wild, how to build a full- featured backdoor, and how to detect and prevent these attacks from occurring.
Over the years, XML has been a rich target for attackers due to flaws in its design as well as implementations. It is a tempting target because it is used by other programming languages to interconnect applications and is supported by web browsers. In this talk, I will demonstrate how to use XSLT to produce documents that are vulnerable to new exploits. XSLT can be leveraged to affect the integrity of arithmetic operations, lead to code logic failure, or cause random values to use the same initialization vector. Error disclosure has always provided valuable information, but thanks to XSLT, it is possible to partially read system files that could disclose service or system's passwords. Finally, XSLT can be used to compromise end- user confidentiality by abusing the same- origin policy concept present in web browsers. This presentation includes proof- of- concept attacks demonstrating XSLTs potential to affect production systems, along with recommendations for safe development.
Hardware attacks are often overlooked since they are generally considered to be complex and resource intensive. However certain industries, such as pay TV, are plagued by piracy and hardware counterfeits. The threat of piracy was so great that pay TV manufacturers were forced to create extensive countermeasures to protect their smartcards in the field.
One of the most effective countermeasures is to implement parts or all of their proprietary algorithms in hardware. To analyze proprietary hardware implementations additional analysis techniques are necessary.
It is no longer sufficient to follow individual signals on the chip. Instead, full extraction and analysis of the device's netlist is necessary. This talk will focus on a case study of a widely- used pay TV smartcard.
The card includes extensive custom hardware functions and has yet to be compromised after over 5 years in the field. This talk will demonstrate the tools and techniques necessary for successfully performing the analysis of such a target. The research highlights the capabilities of advanced analysis techniques.
Such techniques also make analysis significantly more efficient, reducing the time required for a study from many months to a few weeks. GSM networks are compromised for over five years.
Starting from passive sniffing of unencrypted traffic, moving to a fully compromised A5/1 encryption and then even to your own base station, we have different tools and opportunities. A Motorola phone retails for only $5 gives you the opportunity to peep into your girlfriend's calls. RTL- SDR retails for $2. Lastly, USRP retails for $7.
G. But who cares about 2. G? Those who are concerned switched off of 2. G. AT& T is preparing to switch off all its 2. G networks by the end of 2. Even GSMA (GSM Alliance) admitted that security through obscurity is a bad idea (referring to COMP1. A5/*, GEA algorithms and other things).
G and LTE networks have mandatory cryptographical integrity checks for all communications, mutual authentication both for mobile devices and base station. The opportunity to analyze all protocols and cryptographical primitives due to their public availability is important. However, the main problem is that we do not have calypso phones for 3. G. We do not have cheap and ready to use devices to fuzz 3. G devices over the air.
Or do we? What about femtocells? Perhaps telecoms are to fast to take their guard down with security considerations embedded in 3. G/4. G? Users can connect to femocells. Internet on high speeds, make calls, ect. Why don't we abuse it?
Yes, there is already research that allows you to gain control over femtocell. There is also research that allows sniffing calls and messages after gaining control. But all such solutions are not scalable. You are still bound to the telecom provider. You still have to connect to a VPN - to a core network. You have to bypass location binding and so on. Perhaps there is an easier solution?
Parhaps we can create UMTS- in- a- box from readily available femtocell and have them available in large quantities without telecom- branding? We already know. We will tell the whole story from unboxing to proof- of- concept data intercept and vulnerabilities in UMTS networks with all your favorite acronyms: HNB, Se. GW, HMS, RANAP, SCTP, TR- 0. In recent months, we focus on bug hunting to achieve root on android devices. Our kernel fuzzing, leaded by @wushi, generated a lot of crashes and among them, we found a kernel Use- After- Free bug which lies in all versions of Linux kernel and we successfully take advantage of it to root most android devices(version> =4.
We leverage this bug to root whatever android devices(version> =4. And also we are the first one in the world, as far as we are aware, rooting the 6.
The related kernel exploitation method is unique. In this talk, we will explain the root cause of this UAF bug and also the methods used to exploit it. We will demonstrate how we can fill the kernel memory once occupied by the vulnerable freed kernel object with fully user- controlled data by spraying and finally achieved arbitrarily code execution in kernel mode to gain root. All our spraying methods and exploiting ways apply to the latest Android kernel, and we also bypass all the modern kernel mitigations on Android device like PXN and so on.
Even introduced 6. And a very important thing is that the rooting is stable and reliable.
Actually, we will present a common way to exploit android kernel Use- After- Free bug to gain root. We will also cover some new kernel security issue on the upcoming 6. The world of security is riddled with assumptions and guesses. Using data collected from hundreds of millions of Android devices, we'll establish a baseline for the major factors driving security in the Android ecosystem.